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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES, 
INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-vs-
CARNES CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, and LONG DEMING 
UTAH, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15928 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., brought an 
action for the collection of a sales commission against 
Carnes Company 1 and Long Deming Utah, Inc. This is an 
appeal to review the decisions of the district court that 
Carnes Company is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Courts. 
Carnes Company is an unincorporated division of 
Wehr Corporation, a foreign corporation not qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah. Carnes Company has appeared 
l. See note 2 infra. 
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specially throughout all of the proceedings in this action, 
without entering a general appearance, and it does not enter 
a general appearance now. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 18, 1974, and on March 5, 1975, the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, granted the motion of Carnes 
Company to quash the service of summons made upon it. 
On May 30, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
once again granted the motion of Carnes Company to quash the 
service of suinmons made upon it. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Carnes Company prays the orders be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., is a 
Utah corporation engaged in the business of distributing 
heating, ventilating and refrigeration equipment for manu-
facturers of those products. Defendant Carnes Corporation 
(herein "Carnes") is a division of Wehr Corporation, a 
-2-
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Wisconsin corporation not qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah.
2 
Carnes is a manufacturer of ventilation 
equipment. 
On approximately May 24, 1961, plaintiff entered 
into a contract with Carnes. (R. 144-154). Under the con-
tract plaintiff agreed to act as an independent sales repre-
sentative for Carnes' products in Utah and portions of Idaho 
and Wyoming. During the term of the sales agreement, plain-
tiff solicited orders for Carnes' equipment on a commission 
basis. Plaintiff also acted as a sales representative for 
several competitors of Carnes, and the Carnes product-line 
constituted only a small part of the plaintiff's business. 
(R. 136-137). 
On approximately August 29, 1968, the sales agree-
ment between plaintiff and Carnes was terminated. Defendant 
Long Deming Utah, Inc., entered into a sales agreement with 
Carnes on September 3, 1968, thereby becoming the plaintiff's 
successor as the sales representative of Carnes in Utah. (R. 175). 
On October 23, 1973, plaintiff filed a complaint 
against Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc., 3 in three counts: 
2. carnes Corporation later becarre an unincorporated division of 
Wehr Corporation, and it is naw known as Carnes eorrpany. 
3. Long Deming Utah, Inc., is not a party to this appeal. 
-3-
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(1) that the plaintiff's relationship as sales representa-
tive was terminated after the plaintiff had obtained a 
tentative order for Carnes' equipment to be installed in the 
proposed office building of the L.D.S. Church, and before 
the construction contracts for the building were awarded; 
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to the commission on the 
equipment eventually ordered, notwithstanding the subsequent 
sales agreement between the defendants and the provisions of 
plaintiff's contract; (2) that if not entitled to the full 
commission, plaintiff was entitled to a portion of it; and 
(3) that the defendants had conspired to terminate the 
plain~~ff's agreement with Carnes; therefore, plaintiff was 
<::;t.. ::~eC: not only to the commission lost on the office 
building but to other unspecified lost commissions and 
punitive damages as well. (R. 160-163). 
Plaintiff attempted to serve process on Carnes in 
Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute (R. 158-159), and 
also attempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service on Lyn 
Felton. (R. 156). At the time of service on October 29, 
1973, Mr. Felton was the vice-president of Long Deming, 
Utah, Inc. (R. 496-497). 
On November 28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion pur-
suant to Rule l2(b)(2),(4), and (5), U.R.C.P., to quash the 
service and dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 
-<-!-
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court did not have jurisdiction over Carnes. (R. 139). 
Affidavits were filed by both the plaintiff and Carnes 
(R.l33-134; 135-137), and on October 1, 1974, the motion was 
heard by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall. On October 18, 1974, 
he entered an order quashing service and dismissing plain-
tiff's complaint against Carnes, the court having no juris-
diction. (R. 121-122). Plaintiff then filed a motion for 
reconsideration or to vacate or, in the alternative, amend 
judgment. (R. 133-114). 
On November 7, 1974, plaintiff filed a motion for 
the issuance of a writ of attachment. (R. 109). The motion 
was granted ~ parte by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jr., on the same day, and a writ was thereafter issued and 
served. (R. 105-106). The order authorizing the writ was 
obtained without notice to Carnes' or its counsel, nor was 
Carnes' counsel given notice either before or after the 
actual issuance of the writ. Upon learning of the attach-
ment, Carnes filed a motion for its release. (R. 102). At 
the time of the attachment proceedings, Judge Hall's order 
to quash service and dismiss the complaint against Carnes 
had been entered and was effective pending only the plain-
tiff's motion for reconsideration. The latter motion, dated 
October 25, 1974, was not noticed for hearing until Carnes' 
original notice of January 14, 1975. (R. 93). 
-5-
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On March 5, 1975, Judge Hall, after argument, 
reconsidered his earlier order and, although declining to 
amend his determination that jurisdiction had not been 
obtained over Carnes, he ruled that the complaint itself 
should remain in good standing in the event jurisdiction 
could be obtained later. (R. 74-75). Plaintiff filed a 
notice of intent to appeal. 
In an order dated March 28, 1975, Judge Hanson 
released the attachment on the basis of Carnes' motion. 
(R. 65-66). In his order, however, Judge Hanson included a 
paragraph which noted that the filing of the motion for the 
release of the attachment constituted a general appearance 
by Carnes. The question of whether Carnes had been properly 
served either by the service on a local party or under the 
long-arm statute was argued but not ruled upon because the 
court had already determined a general appearance had been 
made. 
Carnes then filed a petition for interlocutory 
appeal with this Court on the ground that Judge Hanson had 
erred in holding Carnes had appeared generally. (R. 3-7). 
Plaintiff also sought interlocutory appeal on the issue of 
long-arm jurisdiction. On March 16, 1976, this Court re-
versed Judge Hanson and held that Carnes had not in fact 
-6-
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entered a general appearance in this lawsuit. See Ted R. 
Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 
(Utah 1976). No action was taken on the plaintiff's request 
for interlocutory appeal. 
Despite Judge Hall's ruling that the long-arm 
statute did not apply and this Court's refusal to review 
that ruling, plaintiff persisted in its attempts to reliti-
gate the issue. On February 10, 1977, plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Order Declaring Service of Summons on Carnes 
Corporation Sufficient, Directing Carnes to Respond or Be 
Found in Default. (R. 197-199). Paragraph 5 of that motion 
provided: 
5. By virtue of discovery procedures 
carried out by the Plaintiff, information 
has now been obtained and is set forth in 
the Stipulation duly signed by ROBERT D. 
MERRILL, Attorney for LONG DEMING UTAH, 
INC., which sets forth information suffi-
cient to show that CARNES CORPORATION did 
in fact do business within the State of 
Utah within the statutory definition of 
the Long Arm Statute 78-27-23 U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended and is thereby subject to ser-
vice under said statute as doing business 
within the state of Utah as defined by 
Statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff's motion was heard on February 17, 1977, by the 
Honorable Hal s. Taylor. He entered an order on March 3, 
1977, denying plaintiff's motion. (R. 222-223). 
-7-
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In March, 1977, plaintiff again attempted to serve 
Carnes in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute (R. 234-
235) and also attempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service 
on Richard Barrett McDowell. (R. 229-230). At the time of 
service on March 15, 1977, Mr. McDowell was the vice-presi-
dent of Utemp, Inc. (R. 599-600). Utemp was a Utah corpora-
tion which conducted portions of its business activities 
through its unincorporated division known as Utah Air Sales. 
Long Deming Utah, Inc.'s status as a sales representative of 
Carnes was terminated on September 15, 1975, and Utah Air 
Sales had succeeded to that position. (R. 251). 
On April 6, 1977, Carnes again filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (2), (3), (4) and (5), U.R.C.P., 
on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over 
Carnes. (R. 232). The motion to dismiss was based on two 
considerations: (1) that the complaint served in Utah on 
Mr. McDowell was insufficient as service of process on 
Carnes under Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and (2) that the 
issues of whether Carnes was doing business in the State of 
Utah and whether the Utah courts thereby acquired jurisdic-
tion over Carnes pursuant to the long-arm statute, had 
already been determined adversely to plaintiff on three 
separate occasions and they should not be litigated again. 
-8-
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On April 21, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for an 
order designating a special hearing on Carnes' motion to 
dismiss. (R. 237-238). The special hearing would, accord-
ing to the plaintiff, enable it to present witnesses, intro-
duce documents and evidence, and present extensive argument, 
all designed to demonstrate that the state courts had juris-
diction over Carnes. The hearing was opposed by Carnes on 
the elementary ground there were no issues concerning ser-
vice of process and jurisdiction which remained to be decided. 
(R. 269). 
On August 23, 1977, the plaintiff's motion for a 
special evidentiary hearing and Carnes' motion to dismiss 
were heard by the Honorable David B. Dee. On November 13, 
1977, Judge Dee issued a memorandum decision in which he 
denied Carnes' motion to dismiss. He granted, instead, the 
plaintiff's motion for a special hearing, authorizing the 
introduction into evidence of all facts concerning Carnes' 
activities in the state in order to determine whether it was 
doing business here and had thereby subjected itself to the 
jurisdiction of the state courts. (R. 306-307). 
On December 16, 1977, Carnes filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal to this Court from Judge Dee's order. 
The petition was denied on January 9, 1978. (R. 320). 
-9-
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The evidentiary hearing granted to the plaintiff 
by Judge Dee was held on January 11-12, 1978, before the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary. On the basis of that hearing 
Judge Leary granted Carnes' motion to dismiss. He specifi-
cally held that service of process on Mr. Felton and on Mr. 
McDowell was not service on Carnes, and that no evidence 
supporting the applicability of the long-arm statute was 
presented that was not available to the plaintiff when the 
jurisdiction issue was originally raised and litigated in 
1974 before Judge Hall. (R. 322-326, 350-356). 
This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
This appeal is not concerned with the merits of 
the plaintiff's claims, but only with the question of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Carnes. Plaintiff has argued its 
position four times and on each occasion Carnes has pre-
vailed. Now, for the fifth time, plaintiff seeks another 
opportunity to articulate the same issue. Its attempts to 
litigate the issue repeatedly, each time piecing-in slightly 
more evidence until its position, hopefully, meets with 
success, cannot be countenanced. Plaintiff had its day in 
-10-
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court. It cannot now be heard to say after losing that it 
should be given further opportunity to develop its case. 
Carnes contends the orders dismissing it from this 
action, based on the state courts' lack of jurisdiction over 
it, should be affirmed. This must be the result in view of 
the substantial evidence previously presented to the trial 
courts. 
I. THE APPEAL IS PREMATURE SINCE 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS ARE 
NOT FINAL AND IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE. 
There is, at the outset, a genuine question of 
this Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court's 
authority to review the decisions of the district courts is 
specifically limited by law to final orders and judgments. 
See, e.g., Utah Const. Art. VIII, §9; §78-4-17 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953); Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P. The two orders appealed 
by the plaintiff are not final and, therefore, they are not 
now appealable to this Court. The appeal is premature. 
Where, as here, several defendants are charged 
with concerted wrongdoing, 4 an order dismissing one of them 
from the action for lack of personal jurisdiction is not 
4. Both the complaint and amended cc:rnplaint allege that Carnes 
and Long Deming Utah, Inc., conspired to terminate the plaintiff's 
sales representative contract. The prayer for that claim seeks 
relief from the defendants jointly. (R. 160-163; 337-341). 
-11-
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immediately appealable as a final decision. Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of a 
judgment in actions with multiple parties; it provides: 
When more than one claim for relief 
is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the en-
try of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for de-
lay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 
all the parties shall not terminate the ac-
tion as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is sub-
ject to revision at any time before the en-
try of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
Under the rule, then, an order or other form of decision, 
however designated, is not final if it adjudicates any of 
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties 
in the action. The order may become final and immediately 
appealable only after the district court has completed two 
tasks: (1) it must make an express determination that there 
is no just reason for a delay in the entry of the judgment; 
and (2) it must expressly direct the entry of the judgment. 
-12-
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The objective of the rule is to prevent the unnecessary ex-
pense and delay of piecemeal appeals by requiring the par-
ties to present the whole cause for review in a single 
appeal. 
There are no Utah cases which have addressed this 
precise issue under Rule 54(b) of the Utah procedural rules. 5 
There is, however, persuasive authority from other jurisdic-
tions which indicates that the dismissal of fewer than all 
parties for lack of personal jurisdiction falls squarely 
within the ambit of the rule. For example, decisions inter-
preting Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
5. Rule 54 (b) has been addressed by this Court in only one re-
ported decision, that of M & S Construction and Engineering eo. 
v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
That opinion dealt with the issue of multiple claims under the rule 
rather than the issue of multiple parties, as here. 'Ihe plain-
tiff's complaint had been dismissed with prejudice by the district 
court, and one of the two defendants had been granted judgment on 
its counterclaim against the plaintiff and it also had been granted 
judgment on its =ss-clairn against the other defendant. The 
Suprerre Court reversed the dismissal of the complaint but it re-
fused to disturb the defendant's judgments on its counterclaim and 
cross-claim. In light of the reversal and rerrand for trial, less 
than all of the claims presented in the action had been adjudi-
cated; there had been no express determination by the district 
court as required in Rule 54 (b) ; and, therefore, the defendant's 
judgments were not final, were subject to revision, and could not 
then be reviewed by the Suprerre Court. 
The opinion is i.mp::Jrtant here for its unequivocal recognition 
of the necessity for the district court's "certification" under 
Rule 54 (b) in actions of multiple claims and/or parties. Without 
certification, the order is not final and imrediately appealable. 
-13-
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which is virtually identical to the Utah rule, 6 hold that in 
these circumstances such jurisdictional orders are not final 
and not appealable without the district court's certifica-
tion. See, e.g., Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Pride Manufactur-
ing, Inc., 427 F.2d 297 (3rd Cir. 1970) (where district 
court entered its certificate, the appeal was valid from an 
order dismissing the corporate defendant for lack of juris-
diction and the action remained pending for another defen-
dant); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2nd 
6 . The Utah rule contains two minor changes of phraseology, 
including a substitution of "and/or" for "or" after "third-party 
::laim," and an insertion of "by the court" after "express deter-
mination," both in the first sentence. The federal rule provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
or third-party claim, or when rrul tiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of 
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination that there is no just 
reascn for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, ho.vever designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or 
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action as 
to any of the claims or parties , and the order 
or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any ti.m2 before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
-14-
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Cir. 1969) (in wrongful death action, district court dis-
missed non-resident defendants for lack of jurisdiction and 
entered a 54(b) certificate from which valid appeal was 
taken); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ameri-
can State Bank, 372 F.2d 449 (lOth Cir. 1967) (where the 
district court executed its certificate under Rule 54(b), 
the appeal was valid from an order of the trial court vaca-
ting its previous order allowing the filing of the third-
party complaint, quashing the service, and dismissing them 
from the action); see generally 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice •54.27[6] at 343-344 (2d ed. 1978). 
It is readily apparent from a review of the record 
that neither Judge Hall nor Judge Leary was requested by 
plaintiff to enter the necessary two-prong determination 
under Rule 54(b). The orders are, therefore, not appealable. 
II. JUDGE LEARY PROPERLY DETERMINED 
AFTER A HEARING THAT JUDGE HALL'S 
DETERMINATION WAS CORRECT. 
In his order of May 30, 1978, Judge Leary granted 
Carnes' motion to dismiss, thereby quashing service of pro-
cess upon it. (R. 355). In addition, he specifically held 
as follows: 
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Substantially all of the evidence pre-
sented before this Court was peculiarly with-
in the knowledge of Plaintiff, was obtainable 
by interrogation of the witnesses Young and 
Tregeagle, or by discovery prior to the hear-
ing before Judge Hall on or about October 1, 
1974. (R. 355). 
He explained the latter holding more thoroughly in his memo-
randurn decision. (R. 324-325). He noted that the plaintiff 
had both a right and an opportunity to present evidence in 
opposition to Carnes' motion to dismiss before Judge Hall on 
October 1, 1974; that the plaintiff had ample time between 
the filing of the complaint (October 26, 1973) and the hear-
ing before Judge Hall (October 1, 1974) in which to conduct 
iisccvery related to the applicability of the long-arm sta-
tute to Carnes and related to any agency relationship be-
tween Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc., for purposes of 
service under Rule 4(e); and that plaintiff did not commence 
discovery until January 8, 1975. He concluded, therefore, 
that since substantially all of the evidence presented to 
him could have been presented timely to Judge Hall, he would 
not overrule Judge Hall's prior decision of dismissal. 
The record supports Judge Leary's reasoning. In 
the hearing of October 1, 1974, before Judge Hall, the plaiY 
tiff did not attempt to present substantial evidence concern-
ing Carnes' business activities in Utah. It offered only a 
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single, conclusionary affidavit from its corporate presi-
dent. (R. 133-134). This point is even more significant 
given the two additional considerations that the plaintiff 
took it upon itself to notice-up the Carnes' motion for a 
hearing, and that the hearing date was at least ten (10) 
months subsequent to the date on which the motion was ori-
ginally filed with the court by Carnes. During this time 
span the plaintiff could have conducted discovery related to 
the jurisdictional issues. Although plaintiff had the oppor-
tunity to submit any interrogatories, depose any witnesses 
or parties, file requests for admission or seek the produc-
tion of any documents that would support its case, it elected 
to notice Carnes' motion for hearing before the court on the 
strength of its president's affidavit only. Plaintiff had 
its day in court and, as Judge Leary concluded, it cannot 
now be heard to say after losing that it should be given 
further opportunity to develop its case. The issues of 
whether Carnes was doing business in the State of Utah and 
whether the state courts thereby acquired jurisdiction over 
Carnes, were already submitted to the court and the issues 
decided. 
The plaintiff's criticism of Judge Leary's conclu-
sion is two-fold. First, 7 it concedes that evidence could 
7. Appellant's Brief at 48-49. 
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have been presented to Judge Hall but only in the form of 
affidavits. And, it suggests that if more formal and exten-
sive evidence should have been presented, there is nothing 
in the record which indicates the plaintiff failed to re-
quest such a hearing before Judge Hall. Carnes' response to 
the argument is brief. Plaintiff bears the responsibility 
of preparing its own case. It alone must decide what evi-
dence to offer, when to do so and in what manner. If it 
considered affidavits inadequate, it should have pursued 
alternate tactics. If it deemed a formal evidentiary hear-
l~g to be crucial it should have demanded it in a manner 
ceslgned to protect its record. 
Second,B plaintiff contends the issue of overrul-
ing Judge Hall's determination was never presented to Judge 
Leary. In fact, quite the opposite is true. During the 
evidentiary hearing before Judge Leary, counsel for Carnes 
repeatedly objected to matters on the basis they had already 
been presented to Judge Hall and decided. 
422; 497; 514-515). 
8. Appellant's Brief at 50-51. 
-18-
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III. CARNES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURTS 
UNDER THE LONG-ARM STATUTE. 
Plaintiff insists Carnes has actively transacted 
business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah Long-Arm 
Statute and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of 
the local courts. Whatever the conceptual simplicity of 
plaintiff's argument in its brief, it wholly ignores both 
the facts of this case and the controling legal principles. 
In several paragraphs 9 plaintiff belittles Carnes' 
legal argument to Judge Hall that the plaintiff's claims did 
not arise within the coverage of the long-arm statute. To 
the contrary, that argument is correct. It is important to 
remember that the complaint served on Carnes in Wisconsin in 
1977 was identical in language to the one originally filed 
by the plaintiff in 1973. Neither made an allegation of 
specific types of conduct which should render Carnes subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. Rather, they merely 
recited that jurisdiction was based on a single subparagraph 
of the long-arm statute, §78-27-24(2), and on related but 
unspecified provisions of the Utah Code. That provisions 
provides as follows: 
9. Appellant's Brief at 38, 45-46. 
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Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent, does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
* * * 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
* * * 
On the basis of this jurisdictional allegation Carnes moved 
to dismiss this action on November 28, 1973. It set forth 
seve:cal arguments in its supporting memorandum. (R. 125-132). 
flrs~, it contended that the long-arm statute provision 
relied on by the plaintiff was inapplicable to the plain-
tiff's claims. It is critical to observe that §78-27-26 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) permits only those claims arising from 
acts specifically enumerated in §78-27-24 to be asserted 
against a defendant over whom jurisdiction is based on the 
long-arm statute. The plaintiff's claims did not arise 
from Carnes' contractual agreement to supply equipment to 
third parties in the State of Utah. There have been no 
claims covering that equipment, either the manner in which 
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it was supplied or its quality. Indeed not. This cause of 
action arose, as stated in the complaint, solely from an 
allged breach and wrongful termination of the plaintiff's 
sales representative agreement with Carnes. The equipment 
supplied by Carnes to the church office building has nothing 
to do with the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, 
other than to establish a measure of damages for the lost 
sales commissions. Subsection (2) of §78-27-24 cannot, there-
fore, support a claim of jurisdiction over Carnes. 
Plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint in 
January, 1978, in order to plead jurisdiction on the speci-
fic basis of the entire Utah Long-Arm Statute and those pro-
visions in §§78-27-20,to 28 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and also 
on the general basis of a repetitive, blanket statement that 
Carnes had done business within the State of Utah. Atten-
tion is, therefore, directed to the entire Utah Long-Arm 
Statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court first interpreted the long-
arm statute in Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 
332 (1971). There, an employee commenced an action in the 
Utah state courts against his former employer, a Texas 
corporation. The defendant was a parent corporation of 
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numerous wholly-owned subsidiary corporations operating as 
retail outlets throughout the United States, including Utah. 
The plaintiff had been employed for nine and one-half years 
in several of the defendant's subsidiaries. Plaintiff 
brought suit in Utah for wages and fringe benefits he 
claimed due for services rendered to one of the defendant's 
subsidiaries in another state. Service of process was made 
upon the assistant vice-president and regional manager of 
the defendant, whose office was in Utah. 
The district court granted the defendant's motion 
to dismiss the action on the ground that the defendant was a 
:0reig2 corporation not subject to service of process 
Nc~~~~ the State of Utah. This Court reversed an appeal, 
holding that the defendant corporation had, in a continuous 
and regular manner over a period of years, maintained such 
contacts and carried on such activities within the state of 
Utah that it should be subject to the jurisdiction of its 
courts. The Court noted that the officers and directors of 
the defendant were practically identical with those of its 
Utah subsidicaries; that the defendant had engaged in adver· 
tising and other promotional activity in Utah; that in its 
promotional activity the defendant gave no indication the 
local subsidiaries were separate corporate entities from t~ 
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parent; and that the defendant exercised extensive control 
over the business operations of its local subsidiaries, 
including control of security, auditing, receipts, disburse-
ments, and employee wages and incentive awards. 
In reaching its decision the Court analyzed the 
provisions of the Utah long-arm statute, and it expressed 
the appropriate judicial inquiry in the following manner: 
It is appreciated that the language [of 
the long-arm statute] just quoted is necessarily 
a broad-sounding generality; and that it must be 
so interpreted and applied as to conform with 
basic concepts of fairness and due process of 
law. This mandates that a foreign corporation 
should not be subjected to undue difficulties 
from lawsuits merely because its products are 
distributed in this State, or may be purchased 
and sold by others therein .... 
* * * 
When the problem [of acquiring jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation] arises, its 
solution depends on whether it can fairly be 
said that the corporation is doing business 
within the State in a real and substantial 
sense. This involves the analysis of a number 
of factors, none of which is alone the sine 
qua non to establish a business presence in 
the State, but from a consideration of the 
total picture as to the existence or absence 
of them the answer to that critical question 
is to be found: 
1. Whether there are local offices, 
stores or outlets; 
2. The presence of personnel, how 
hired, fired and paid; the degree of con-
trol and the nature of their duties; 
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3. The manner of holding out to 
the public by way of advertising, tele-
phone listings, catalogs, etc.; 
4. The presence of its property, real 
or personal, or interest therein, including 
inventories, bank accounts, etc.; 
5. Whether the activities are spor-
atic or transitory as compared to continuous 
and systematic; 
6. The extent to which the alleged 
facts of the asserted claim arose from acti-
vities within the state; 
7. The relative hardship or conven-
ience to the parties in being required to 
litigate the controversy in the state or 
elsewhere. 
482 P. 2d at 333-334. (citations omitted.) 
After the Hill decision the Court consistently 
applled the enumerated criteria to determine whether the 
activities of a foreign corporation in this state should 
subject it to the jurisdiction of the local courts. See, 
e.g., Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186 
(Utah 1974); Mack Financial Corp. v. Nevada Motor Rentals, 
Inc., 529 P. 2d 429 (Utah 1974); Kocha v. Gibson Products co., 
535 P.2d 680 (Utah 1975). And eventually, the Court's 
analysis and approach to the long-arm statute as announced 
in Hill was expressly reaffirmed in its decision of Union~ 
Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1976) · 
There, a Utah corporation sued a California corporation for 
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breach of a contract. The contract at issue was an exclu-
sive distributorship agreement under which the defendant had 
agreed to manufacture ski boots in California and supply 
them to the plaintiff for distribution and sale in Utah and 
elsewhere. During the course of dealings between the par-
ties, the defendant's agents made at least four business 
trips to Utah to negotiate the terms of the contract, in-
spect the plaintiff's facilities and operations, engage 
local boot designers, and participate in meetings to plan 
the sale and promotion of the boots. The plaintiff made an 
advance payment and secured a substantial order for the 
boots. The defendant never supplied any boots to the plain-
tiff. 
The district court granted the defendant's motion 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the long-
arm statute. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision on 
appeal. It referred to the Hill criteria and noted that the 
California corporation had no local office, store, property, 
inventory, telephone listing or bank account and had done no 
local advertising. The Court also noted that other elements 
of the arrangement had occurred outside Utah: California 
was where the contract had been executed and allegedly 
breached, where the boots were to be manufactured, and where 
the payments were to be made; all shipments were to be 
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delivered F.O.B. the defendant's factory in California; and 
California law would govern the contractual arrangement. 
After Union Ski, the Hill criteria provided the 
focal point of analysis in still other, subsequent cases. 
See, e.g., White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1976); Cate Rental Co., Inc., v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 
(Utah 1976); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Mecham, 550 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1976); Packaging Corp. of America v. Horris, 561 P.2d 
680 (Utah 1977). 
Finally, in its opinion of Abbott G.M. Diesel, 
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), the Court 
re-evaluated the method of jurisdictional analysis it had 
expressed earlier in Hill. The Court noted a distinction 
between the "doing business" and the "minimum contact" 
tests. The doing business concept allows "general" persoMl 
jurisdiction (i.e., on claims which are either related or 
unrelated to forum activity) over a defendant which has 
substantial and continuous local activity. The minimum 
contact test under the long-arm statute is different, how-
ever. According to the Court, it permits only the exercise 
of "specific" or limited personal jurisdiction: where a 
foreign defendant has isolated, minimum contacts with the 
forum through its transaction of business there, personal 
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jurisdiction may be asserted only on claims arising out of 
the defendant's forum activity. Obviously, then, the min-
imum contact test is based on a measurement of the quality 
and nature of the defendant's activities within the forum. 
For that reason the Court suggested that the district court 
conduct a hearing to resolve any conflicts of facts stated 
in the competing jurisdictional arguments of the parties. 
The hearing should be governed by inquiries into and an 
assessment of the defendant's forum activity, including: 
1. the nature and quality of the defendant's 
acts; 
2. whether the defendant engaged in 
purposeful --rather than unintentional -- acts in order 
to avail itself of the privilege and protections here; 
and the substance -- not just form -- of the defen-
dant's business relationship and acts should be ascer-
tained; and, 
3. any other relevant matters bearing on "notions 
of fair play and substantial justice." 578 P.2d at 
854. 
Irrespective of the standard used -- the doing 
business concept and its enumerated criteria as analyzed in 
Hill, or the minimum contact test with its attendant eviden-
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tiary hearing by the trial court as discussed in Abbott --
Carnes has not subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the 
Utah courts. Consider, first, the following description of 
Carnes' business operations: 
Carnes is an unincorporated subdivison of Wehr 
Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation engaged in 
the manufacture of heating, ventilating and 
refrigeration equipment. Its office and factory 
are located in Wisconsin, as are its records and 
principal officers. Carnes has never qualified~ 
do business in the State of Utah and it does not 
carry-on business in Utah. It has no local offi-
ces, manufacturing facilities, warehouses, stores 
or outlets in Utah; it has no affiliated company 
in Utah; it has no agents or personnel residing ~ 
Utah nor do any personnel regularly visit Utah. 
Carnes does not own real property in Utah; it does 
not have personal property, including inventories, 
in Utah._ Carnes has not engaged in any advertis-
ing directed specifically at potential customers 
in the State of Utah,lO and it does not maintain a 
10. Other than by including a copy of Utah Air Sales' 
card in the Carnes Company catalog. 
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telephone listing in the state. Carnes has no 
bank accounts or investments in Utah. Carnes 
products are sold in Utah only by independent 
sales representatives, but Carnes has no pecuniary 
interest in or supervisory control over them.ll 
(R. 135-138; 239-246; 251-254; 482-486; 517-521; 
612-161; 645-653). 
The foregoing facts were presented to the district court in 
four separate proceedings. On each occasion the issues of 
whether Carnes was doing business in the State of Utah and 
whether the local courts had acquired jurisdiction over it 
pursuant to the long-arm statute, were determined adversely 
to plaintiff: 
On November 28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion to 
quash the service and dismiss the complaint, pursuant to 
Rule 12 (b) (2), (4), (5), U.R.C.P. On October 18, 1974, Judge 
Hall granted the motion, ruling that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over Carnes. 
On October 25, 1974, plaintiff filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the judgment and the issue of juris-
diction was before the court a second time. On March 5, 
1975, Judge Hall expressly declined to change his prior 
ruling that long-arm jurisdiction over Carnes had not been 
obtained. 
11. The business operations of the sales representatives and 
their relationship to Carnes are described in Argument N of this 
brief. 
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The issue was considered for a third time when, 00 
February 10, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for an order 
declaring that service of summons had been made on Carnes. 
On March 3, 1977, Judge Taylor denied the motion, thereby 
rejecting the plaintiff's jurisdictional issue again. 
And, on Janury 11-12, 1978, the plaintiff received 
a special hearing before Judge Leary in which to argue the 
question of jurisdiction for the fourth time. The hearing 
was conducted in strict accordance with this Court's ins true· 
tions in Abbott. All parties were afforded an opportunity 
to presenc witnesses, to introduce documents and evidence, 
~;-.c ~= ~i-,-e extensive argument, all designed to determine 
the exlstence of jurisdiction over Carnes under the long-am 
statute. On the basis of that plenary hearing and a thor-
ough review of the pleadings, affidavits, and answers to 
interrogatories, Judge Leary again held that Carnes was not 
subject to local jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. 
It is important to remember that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional allegations 
in its complaint. See Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Core' 
supra. Even a cursory review of the record demonstrates the 
plaintiff has not been denied an opportunity to present all 
of the evidence it could marshall concerning Carnes' busl-
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ness activities in Utah, and thereby satisfy its evidentiary 
burden. Resolution of the question is dependent upon the 
trial court's determination of the factual matters and, 
unfortunately for plaintiff, it simply has not convinced any 
trier-of-fact of the correctness of its argument. See 
Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Bill Hartmann Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 177, 515 P.2d 92, 94 (1973). Now, this Court 
should accord to the three trial court judges who have heard 
this case the prerogative of weighing the evidence and of 
drawing inferences from it, and upon that basis determining 
the facts. See Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 
supra. The orders of dismissal granted by Judge Hall and 
Judge Leary should be affirmed. 
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON OFFICERS OF 
LONG DEMING UTAH, INC., AND UTEMP-
UTAH AIR SALES, WAS NOT SERVICE ON 
CARNES UNDER RULE 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P. 
Plaintiff filed its complaint against Carnes on 
October 23, 1973. It attempted to serve process on Carnes 
in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, and it at-
tempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service on Lyn Felton. 
At the time of service on October 29, 1973, Mr. Felton was 
the vice-president of Long Deming Utah, Inc., the indepen-
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dent sales representative for Carnes in Utah. On November 
28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2), 
(4), and (5), U.R.C.P., to quash the service and dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that the court did not have juris-
diction over Carnes. The motion was granted by Judge Hall 
on October 18, 1974. On March 5, 1975, he reconsidered his 
order but declined to amend his determination that juris-
diction had not been obtained over Carnes. 
In March, 1977, plaintiff again attempted to serve 
Carnes in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, and it 
renewed its prior efforts to serve Carnes in Utah, this time 
=~ ser~ice on Richard Barrett McDowell. At the time of 
service, Mr. McDowell was the vice-president of Utemp, Inc. 
Utemp was a Utah corporation which conducted portions of its 
business activities through its unincorporated division known 
as Utah Air Sales. Utah Air Sales had succeeded Long Deming 
Utah, Inc., as the independent sales representative for 
Carnes in Utah. On April 6, 1977, Carnes filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2), (3), (4) and (5), U.R.C.P., 
again contending the court did not have jurisdiction over 
Carnes. The motion to dismiss was based in part on the 
consideration that the complaint served in Utah on Mr. 
McDowell was insufficient as service of process on Carnes. 
The motion to dismiss was granted by Judge Leary on May 30, 
1978. 
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Plaintiff challenges both orders of dismissal, 
contending that service of process on either Long Deming or 
Utah Air Sales was sufficient service on Carnes under Rule 
4(e) (4), U.R.C.P. It reasons that Long Deming and Utah Air 
Sales were independent sales representatives for Carnes; 
that their activities in Utah were on Carnes' behalf and 
constitute doing business in the state by Carnes; and, 
therefore, that service of process on them was tantamount to 
service on Carnes. The plaintiff's argument is incorrect. 
The argument utterly ignores strict compliance 
with the local procedural rule governing service. In order 
to serve process upon a corporation within the State of 
Utah, a plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rule 
4 (e) ( 4) , U. R. C. P. The rule provides: 
(e) Personal service within the state shall be as 
follows: 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein other-
wise provided for, upon a partnership or other 
unincorporated association which is subject 
to suit under a common name, by delivering a 
copy thereof to an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or to any other agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process and, if the agent is one authorized 
by statute to receive service and the statute 
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. If no such officer or agent can be 
found in the county in which the action is 
brought, then upon any such officer or ag7nt, 
or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chlef 
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clerk, or other agent having the management, 
direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorpor-
ated association within the state. If no such 
officer or agent can be found in the sate, and 
the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself 
out as having, an office or place of business 
in this state, or does business in this state, 
then upon the person doing such business or in 
charge of such office or place of business. 
The statute recognizes personal service upon a corporation 
only when it is made upon one of the enumerated individuals. 
For instance, the rule provides that service may be made 
upon an officer; a general agent; an agent specifically 
authorized to receive service of process; an agent having 
~he ~a~agement, direction or control of any corporate pro-
per~j ~lthin the state; or a person doing business or in 
charge of a business office, when a defendant has advertised 
or held itself out as doing business or having an office in 
the state. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that either Long Deming or Utah Air Sales falls within any 
of the foregoing five categories. (R. 517-518; 614-615). 
Neither was, for example, an officer of Carnes or Wehr Cor-
poration. Neither was a managing or general agent of either 
business entity. Neither has ever been appointed by Carnes 
or Wehr Corporation to act as their agent to receive service 
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of process in the state of Utah and, moreover, neither has 
ever received such authority by the laws of this state. 
In fact, Long Deming and Utah Air Sales bear 
absolutely no relationship to Carnes which would substantiate 
service of process on them. They are independently owned 
and operated business entities which act as local sales 
representatives for various and differing manufacturers of 
mechanical equipment. (R. 482). In that connection, each 
has operated as the exclusive sales representative for 
Carnes in Utah on separate occasions; Long Deming's represen-
tation extended from September 3, 1968, to September 15, 1975, 
and Utah Air Sales immediately succeeded to that position. 
Carnes' business dealings with Long Deming and with Utah Air 
Sales were similar, and they were typical of dealings between 
Long Deming, Utah Air Sales and other manufacturers. (R. 
4 82) . Both Long Deming and Utah Air Sales operated as a 
sales representative for various mechanical equipment manu-
facturers, merely offering for sale the Carnes' brand of 
equipment along with other competing lines. (R. 482). 
Neither was an agent, servant or employee of Carnes but 
merely a sales representative by contractual agreement. (R. 
517-518; 614-615). Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, 
each was able to develop the sale of Carnes products in any 
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manner which it deemed advisable, without any control or 
direction from Carnes. For example, each could determine 
which potential customers to contact and what time to devote 
to customer colicitation. Each had its own employees; 
controlled the hours they work, the pay they receive, and 
the basis on which they are paid -- all without direction 
from Carnes. Each received a commission on sales of Carnes' 
equipment in Utah; no other remuneration was extended by 
Ca=nes and each paid its own expenses without reimbursement 
f=8m Carnes. No specific employees were assigned solely to 
3a!es of Carnes' equipment. (R. 494). Each solicited and 
received orders in accordance with price schedules and terns 
established by Carnes. Neither had authority to bind or 
commit Carnes; the acceptance or rejection of orders was 
wholly within the discretion of Carnes, and any acceptance 
or rejection was made by Carnes in Wisconsin. (R. 492.) 
Orders accepted by Carnes constituted agreements between it 
and the customers. Deliveries were as agreed between them an: 
collections were the responsibility of Carnes, unless guaran~' 
by the sales representative, which was an unusual circumstane 
Invoicing was direct from Carnes to the customer, and the 
customer paid Carnes directly. Carnes' final agreements 
with its customers were typically in the form of invoices 
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subject to terms, conditions and warranty. (R. 135-138; 
239-246; 251-254; 482-486; 517-521; 612-616; 645-653). 
In addition to the preceding format, Long Deming 
Utah, Inc., and Utah Air Sales each made purchases from 
Carnes for its own account, including products they held in 
inventory and then resold to customers, and also products 
for particular projects which they resold to their customers. 
Such purchases were F.O.B. Wisconsin and Carnes retained 
no interest in them, other than security, after they were 
purchased. Each was free to represent other manufacturers 
in a capacity similar to that with Carnes and, in fact, each 
did represent other competing manufacturers. The volume 
of business from Carnes' products was less than half of the 
total dollar volume for each. (R. 135-138; 239-246; 251-254; 
482-486; 517-521; 612-616; 645-653). 
The foregoing items are important for two reasons. 
First, they vividly indicate that the activities of Long Dem-
ing and Utah Air Sales in Utah were not on Carnes' behalf 
and did not constitute doing business in the state by Carnes. 
Therefore, Carnes cannot be served by serving either of them. 
See, e.g., western Gas Appliances, Inc., v. Sevel, Inc., 123 
Utah 229, 257 P.2d 950 (1953). After reviewing all of the 
evidence, Judge Leary reached this precise conclusion. In 
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his order of May 30, 1978, he made the following two deter-
minations: 
* * * 
Service of process upon Richard B. McDowell, 
an officer of an independent sales representative 
of Defendant Carnes Company, was not service of 
process upon Defendant Carnes Company within the 
meaning of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Service of process upon Lyn Felton, an offi-
cer of an independent sales representative of De-
fendant Carnes Company, was not service of pro-
cess upon Defendant Carnes Company within the 
meaning of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
* * * 
Second, they pinpoint a dangerous flaw in the 
pl~i~~iff's argument. Observe that Long Deming Utah, Inc., 
ana ~tah Air Sales have done nothing beyond those activities 
and responsibilities normally assumed by a manufacturers' 
sales representative. Nevertheless, the plaintiff vehemently 
suggests that a foreign corporation is automatically subject 
to local jurisdiction whenever business is conducted in this 
manner by its local independent sales representative. Imagine 
the effect of such a standard on the nation's manufacturers: 
If activity by a distributor over whom there. 
is no control other than a mutual right to dls-
continue the distributorship is to be regarded 
as on behalf of the defendant, state lines will 
essentially cease to exist for every manufacturer 
whose goods move in interstate commerce. ~
Wheat Wafers, Inc., v. Venus Foods, Inc., 174 
F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. ~ass. 1959). 
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Indeed, consider whether it would render illusory the con-
stitutional standard of due process in all questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Also, con-
sider whether such service would assure that service upon a 
sales representative would be effectively communicated to 
the manufacturer itself. 
Carnes contends the orders of dismissal granted by 
Judge Hall and Judge Leary should be affirmed. 
V. THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE HALL AND 
JUDGE LEARY WERE PROPER. 
In the third point of its appeal brief the plain-
tiff is content to review and to comment upon the procedural 
history of this case once more. Carnes has no serious 
dispute with most of what is said, so it will limit its 
reply to the following brief comments. 
The plaintiff criticizes Judge Hall for failing to 
explain his rulings. 12 The elementary response to the alle-
gation is that findings by the court were not required. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
part: 
... Findings 
unnecessary 
12 or 56 or 
Rule 4l(b). 
of fact and conclusions of law are 
on decisions of motions under Rule 
any other motion except as provided in 
(emphasis added.) 
12. Appellant's Brief at 39, 40. 
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Moreover, this Court has indicated that if the issues 
material to a ruling on the question of a court's jurisdic-
tion can be identified, it is not necessary for the court to 
have made written findings enumerating them. This principle 
is aptly demonstrated in the opinion of McCarthy v. State, 
Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387 (1953). In that case, plaintiff 
undertook to do work upon a monument at the mouth of Emigra-
tion Canyon. The other contracting party was the "This Is 
the Place Monument Commission", a committee of citizens 
appointed by the Governor of Utah to plan, raise funds for, 
and erect such a monument. Their appointment was made 
pursLan~ to a recommendation by joint resolution of the 
state iegislature, although the legal status of the commis-
sion and its relationship to the state in carrying out the 
directives of the legislature and the governor were not 
clearly defined. The commission received and expended 
appropriations from the state legislature and proceded to 
have the monument erected. 
A dispute developed over the construction work 
done by the plaintiff and his entitlement to payment. For 
that reason he started an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah against the monument 
commission, characterizing it as a voluntary association, 
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and also against its members individually. The commission 
members claimed that neither the association nor its indi-
vidual members were responsible under the contract since 
they were simply acting for the State of Utah, which was the 
real party in interest. The federal court sustained their 
contention and held, for that reason, that it had no juris-
diction of the plaintiff's action against the State of Utah. 
The action was dismissed. 
Approximately nine months later plaintiff insti-
tuted another suit against the State of Utah, the monument 
commission, its executive secretary, and the members indi-
vidually in the Third District Court of the State of Utah. 
The action was eventually dismissed against the individual 
defendants on the ground that the federal court had already 
made a final determination they were not the real parties in 
interest and were not personally responsible. Plaintiff 
appealed the dismissal to the Utah Supreme Court. En route 
to affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action, this 
Court provided the following language: 
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the Federal 
Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, 
the rule of res judicata is not applicable. He 
cites Hutton v. Dodge wherein we announce~ t~e 
general rule that a judgment becomes res JUdlcata 
only when the court has acquired jurisdiction o~er 
the subject matter and the parties. Thls rule lS 
grounded upon the sound principle that litigants 
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are entitled to have an adjudicaton upon the 
merits. It must be conceded that in most in-
stances, if a tribunal has no jurisdiction, there 
is no trial on the merits. However, it is not 
open to question that a judgment of dismissal 
for want of jurisdiction is conclusive as to 
the matters upon which the ruling was neces-
sarily based. In American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated: 'The principles of 
res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as 
well as to other issues.' No reason is apparent 
why the rule should be less applicable to a deci-
sion denying jurisdiction than to one sustaining 
it. 
In the instant case, the conclusion that 
the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction was neces-
sarily based upon a determination of the critical 
issue, i.e., that the individual defendants were 
not personally responsible under the contract. 
The other jurisdictional facts were present: The 
amount exceeded $3,000; there was diversity of 
citizenship between [the parties]. The question 
whether the latter were responsible under the 
contract and therefore proper parties defendant 
was the one which was tried, argued and submitted 
to the Federal Court. The only logical deduction 
that can be drawn is that such was the ground for 
its order of dismissal. And this is true notwith-
standing the fact that the court made no such 
written finding. The issue having been squarely 
presented and determined, it is res judicata as 
between these parties. 265 P.2d at 387. (citations 
omitted). 
The McCarthy opinion indicates that if the issues 
material to a ruling on the question of the court's juris-
diction can be identified, it is not necessary for the court 
to have made written findings enumerating them. Here, there 
were two principal issues material to the prior rulings on 
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jurisdictionmade by Judge Hall. In considering whether 
Carnes fell within the parameters of the long-arm statute, 
he had to consider whether the plaintiff's claim rose from 
contracting to supply services or goods in Utah, and whether 
the minimum contacts of Carnes with this state satisfied the 
constitutional standards for due process. These issues were 
tried, argued and submitted to Judge Hall and he determined 
them by finding no jurisdiction over Carnes. 
Plaintiff also suggestsl3 that by denying Carnes' 
petition for interlocutory appeal, this Court impliedly 
expressed its disapproval of Judge Hall's decision to quash 
the service of summons upon Carnes and dismiss it from the 
action. To make such a suggestion in the absence of an 
opinion from the Court is to succumb to conjecture. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Carnes Company prays 
the orders of dismissal be affirmed. 
13. Appellant's Brief at 45. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 T 4y of March, 1979, 
"""'"--"'~_.....,._,_s 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Carnes Coi"!JJration 
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